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Abstract 
This work addresses some of the arguments regarding equity in
public education versus school performance at issue in the case
of Williams v. State of California. The plaintiff’s expert witnesses
have argued that the state is responsible to reduce the inequities
in California’s public educational system. In contrast, the state’s
witnesses argue that some of the plaintiff’s proposals have limited
educational effects at the cost of reducing local autonomy. In this
paper, I use four years of data from California’s Public Schools
Accountability Act (PSAA) to evaluate these claims.
Introduction
On May 17, 2000, the 46th anniversary of the decision in Brown v. Board of 
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Education outlawing racial segregation in public schools, a class action lawsuit
was filed on behalf of California’s public school students in an effort to make the
state address some of the inequities in California’s public educational system
(Purdum, 2000). Represented by the ACLU and civil rights organizations, the
plaintiffs allege that the state is responsible for ensuring that all public school
children across the state have the right to experience the same quality of
textbooks, teachers, and classrooms. The plaintiff’s experts have documented a
range of inequities in California’s public educational system and have further
argued that these inequities are fundamentally unfair given the high stakes
accountability program California initiated in 1999 with the Public Schools
Accountability Act (PSAA). (Note 1) This legislation mandated the ranking of all
California public schools based on their Academic Performance Index (API),
which has been calculated based on the results from the state-mandated tests
administered to students in grades 2 through 11 in the spring of each school
year. By the winter of 2003, the fifth year of state school rankings will be
released. Over three years later, the case of Williams v. State of California is still 
working its way through the court system; the trial is set to begin August 30,
2004. (Note 2)
In this article, I evaluate the claims made in one expert report written by
Margaret Raymond of the Hoover Institution’s Center for Research on
Educational Outcomes (CREDO) on behalf of the state. (Note 3) In her report,
Raymond utilizes the data generated in the wake of the PSAA to rebut the
plaintiff’s claims. There are four main sections to the article. First, I briefly outline
some of the major claims made by Raymond, focusing specifically on her
analysis of API data. Second, I describe the API and the other sources of data in
the analysis. In this section I also discuss some problems with the data and the
strategies I used to address these problems in my analysis. I also present the
results of my efforts to recreate Raymond’s analysis. In the third and fourth
sections, I provide analyses of the API data addressing the issues of teacher
qualifications and facilities, respectively.
Key Claims
In her report rebutting the plaintiff’s arguments in the case of Williams v. State of
California, Margaret Raymond (2003a) argues that the plaintiffs “haven’t
developed a reliable production function for education that highlights the factors
at issue in this case” (6). In her discussion she focuses on three in particular, the
quality of the teaching staff, facilities, and instructional materials. In her analysis
she specifically focuses on the effect of teacher credentials on school
performance as measured by the Academic Performance Index (API). In part,
this analytical strategy is based on the availability of data. To my knowledge no
state level datasets exist which provide information about facilities and
instructional materials.
In elaborating her point about appropriate research strategies that would provide
evidence supporting the plaintiffs’ claims, Raymond further argues that “[t]o be
confident that the plaintiff’s claims have merit, it would be necessary to study the
effects of each of their proposals under controlled circumstances: that is, to
study the effects on student achievement in schools where the factor is
abundant compared to schools where the factor is scarce, controlling for other
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possible effects” (6). Yet interestingly, she doesn’t appear to follow this strategy
in her own analysis of school API scores, which she uses to draw conclusions
about the influence of credentialed teachers on school performance. Moreover,
the evidence for her assertions is the results from an inappropriate analysis of
API data.
More specifically, Raymond argues that in “educationally challenged” schools,
teacher credentials do not influence school performance as measured by the
Academic Performance Index (API). However, one of her criteria for defining
educationally challenged is the percentage of fully credentialed teachers at a
school. If the percentage of fully credentialed teachers in a school is below the
mean percentage of fully credentialed teachers of the approximately 39 Williams
schools in her analysis and it also has greater percentages of free and reduced
lunch students and minority students than the mean of the Williams’ schools on
these variables, then the school is defined as educationally challenged
(Raymond, 2003a, 12). Using this sample of schools, Raymond constructs an
econometric model which she argues shows that teachers credentials –
measured by the percentage of teachers at a school that are fully credentialed –
have relatively little effect on school API (Raymond, 2003a, 13). She further
argues that the variables in her regression models explain relatively little of the
variation in school API scores.
Before accepting these conclusions, it is important to examine the research
strategy employed in this analysis more closely. One of the criteria for inclusion
in the group “educationally deprived” is that there must be a relatively low
percentage of fully credentialed teachers at a given school. Thus, Raymond uses
a sample of schools in which there is little variation in the availability of fully
credentialed teachers to construct what is basically a tautological argument. If
the schools in her sample are relatively similarly situated in terms of the
percentage of fully credentialed teachers on staff, then it is not surprising that
her regression analysis suggests that teachers’ credentials don’t matter. This
method of sample selection also explains why she obtains what she describes
as a very low R-square for her regression models (13). In a sample of schools
with little variation on the key explanatory variables, it is not surprising to find
they have a relatively small effect on the model when you test for the influence of
these variables on a dependent variable. It is well known that restriction in the
variability of a variable attenuates that variable’s correlation with any other
variable. (Glass & Hopkins, 1996, 121-3) As I will also detail below, it is also
questionable whether or not the comparison sample Raymond utilizes in her
analysis is an appropriate comparison for the Williams schools.
A Brief Overview of the API
The Academic Performance Index (API) is a state-constructed measure of
school performance mandated by the 1999 Public Schools Accountability Act.
From 1999 to 2001, a summary score for each school was constructed by
weighting student scores in each content area of the SAT-9 tests administered to
students in grades 2 through 11 by their national percentile ranking (NPR) and
then weighting each content area to create an overall score (California
Department of Education Office of Policy and Evaluation, 2000, p. 9). For the
calculation of the API for elementary and middle schools, the content areas were
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weighted in the following manner: mathematics 40%, reading 30%, language
15% and spelling 15%. For high schools, the following content areas were each
weighted 20%: Reading, Mathematics, Language, Science, and Social Science.
In 2001, the results from the California Standards Tests (CST) in Language Arts
were incorporated into a 2001 Base API. In addition, a 2001 Growth API using
only the SAT-9 test results was also calculated. The 2002 Growth API was
calculated using the formula for the 2001 Base API. The 2002 Base API utilized
in Raymond’s analysis incorporates the CST in Math for all grades and the
History and Social Science tests for grades 10 and 11 as well as the results of
the High School Exit Examination (HSEE). In the main part of the analysis I
utilized the API scores that are the most comparable across the four years –
1999-2001 API scores calculated using SAT 9 results only and the 2002
“Growth” API, which incorporates the results from the California Standards Test
(CST) in Language Arts only but otherwise is calculated from SAT 9 test scores.
In the section of the analysis reproducing the Raymond analysis, I used the 2002
Base API to ensure relative consistency of results.
In addition to the API rankings, the API datasets made available by the California
Department of Education contain additional variables measuring various types of
school characteristics. Three main categories of variables are utilized in the
analyses here: 1) variables related to students’ background characteristics; 2)
variables related to teacher characteristics; and 3) variables indicating the type
of calendar the school follows. I discuss each type of variable in turn in the
sections that follow.
Student Background Characteristics
% Reduced/Free Lunch is measured by the percentage of students eligible for
reduced or free lunch. Mobility is a state-constructed variable that provides a
measure of the transiency of the student population by indicating the percentage
of test-taking students who first attended the school within the current school
year. Students who first attended the district a given academic year were
excluded from that year’s API calculations. % English Learners denotes the 
percentage of students school-wide reported as English learners. Additional
variables denote the percentages of students belonging to one of 7 racial groups
at each school: African American, American Indian, Hispanic, Asian American,
Filipino, Pacific Islander, and White. One additional student background variable
available in the API data that Raymond utilized in her also requires more
in-depth discussion. The variable for percentage of parents not high school
graduates is one of a series of variables measuring the percentage of parents at
the school that have reached a given educational transition (e.g. high school
graduates, some college, etc.). More importantly for the discussion here,
however is the variable also available in the 2002 Base API data indicating the
percentage of parents responding to this question at the school, % Response for 
Parent Education.
Teacher Characteristics
The API data also contains variables denoting the percentage of teachers at a
school holding full and emergency credentials. According to the CDE website, in
the API datasets, it is possible for one teacher to be in both the fully credentialed
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and emergency credentialed categories. As a result, for some schools, the total
of the percentages for "Fully Credentialed" and "Emergency Credentialed" may
exceed 100. Another issue not addressed by the CDE in their discussion of the
API data is the problem of missing information; for some schools the
percentages of fully credentialed and emergency credentials add to less than 
100. In order to more precisely assess the credentialing at schools, I used
variables drawn from the California Basic Educational Data System (CBEDS)
Professional Assignment Information Form. These files, which contained records
for approximately 325,000 teachers across the state, were aggregated by school
and matched to the API data using the unique code for each school.
Fully Credentialed indicates the percentage of teachers who have completed a
teacher preparation program and hold a preliminary, clear professional, or life
credential. Emergency Credentialed indicates the percentage of teachers that
hold an emergency credential. Emergency credentials are granted to individuals
who are not qualified for a credential or internship but meet minimum certification
requirements. These minimum requirements include: a passing score on the
state’s basic skills exam (CBEST); a bachelor’s degree; and 10 semesters of
college coursework in any four of the following areas -- language studies,
literature, history, social science, mathematics, science, humanities, art, physical
education, and human development (Darling Hammond, 2002.). In addition,
teachers working on emergency permits must submit a statement indicating their
intent to complete the credentialing requirements. Some teachers are designated
as having a full credential AND an emergency credential. This group of teachers
could include teachers who are credentialed in one field but teaching out of field,
or teachers that are credentialed in another state and working on California state
certification (Darling Hammond, 2002.). In the case of the latter, teachers are
counted in a third variable, Both Full and Emergency. An additional variable was
used to indicate whether the teacher’s credential information was missing.
I also added a variable to the analysis that is also available in the Professional
Assignment Information Form. Years Teaching counts the average total years of
educational service among the teaching staff as teachers in any district, state or
country. This figure includes teaching in private school settings but does not
include any years teaching as a substitute teacher or in classified staff positions.
Like the credential variable described above, an additional variable indicated
whether or not the teacher’s information was missing.
School Calendar
Indicator variables for the type of year round school were created from the
CBEDS School Information Form Sections G through K. Traditional indicates 
that the school follows a traditional educational calendar with an extended
summer vacation. Year Round Single-Track indicates that the school operates
on a single-track year-round calendar with more frequent and shorter vacation
periods (usually three a year ranging from three to five weeks in duration). The
major change from the traditional calendar for the year round single-track
calendar is the timing and duration of instructional and vacation periods; all of
the staff and students are in school or in session at the same time (California
Department of Education, 2000). Year Round Multiple-Track indicates that the 
school follows a year-round calendar where the students and faculty are divided
6 of 31
into three to five groups that rotate throughout the year. This schedule is used to
maximize enrollment at the facility; as one group of students and staff go on
vacation, another returns for instruction. Year Round Multiple- Track “Concept 6”
is a specific type of year round multiple-track calendar in which students have
fewer instructional days than the other types of school calendars; instead the
school day is lengthened so students receive the same number of instructional
minutes as the other calendars. Whereas the other types of school calendars
have 180 instructional days in the school year, “Concept 6” schools have 163
(Oakes, 2002). As a result, I distinguish these schools from the other four types
of year round multi-track calendars. The advantage of the “Concept 6”
instructional calendar is that it allows schools to enroll 50% more students that it
would be able to handle at the facility if it were to follow the traditional calendar
(California Department of Education, 2001). In contrast, the other types of year
round multiple-track calendars allow schools to increase their enrollment by 33%
compared to the traditional calendar. An additional variable indicated if calendar
information was missing.
Control Variables
Indicator variables denoting school type (elementary, middle, high) were created
using the school type variable provided in the API dataset and included in the
revised models. As Raymond notes, the median score for the state as a whole
varied considerably by school type with elementary schools having the highest
median scores followed by middle and then high schools. In a critique of another
similar analysis of API scores, Rogosa (2002) argues that given these
differences it is important to control for school type in these and similar analyses
as school type might serve as a proxy for other unmeasured factors (23).
Surprisingly, Raymond (2003b) makes a similar point in her analysis of the API
scores of California charter schools and uses analytical strategies that take
school type into account. However, she does not appear to control for school
type in the analyses provided in the report under discussion here.
Reproducing the Raymond Analysis
In this section, I reproduce the Raymond analysis based on the information
provided in her report. First, I detail the method of selection. Next I provide the
descriptive statistics for the comparison sample and a discussion of how this
group compares with the Williams schools in her analysis and the statewide
sample. Finally, I recreate her regression analysis and also provide an
alternative model with the corrected variables described above.
Selection Method
First, I selected out the 39 schools Raymond listed in Table 1 of her report from
the 2002 API Base data. Of these, 36 had 2002 API scores and complete
information on all variables. (Note 4) I calculated descriptive statistics on the
three measures she used to select her sample of 584 schools: 1) the percentage
minority students; 2) the percentage of students that qualified for reduced or free
lunch; and 3) the percentage of teachers at the school who held full teaching
credentials. Table 1 below provides the descriptive statistics for these three
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variables for the 36 schools:
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Raymond’s Sample Selection Variables
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev.
2002 Base API 425 805 575.56 104.01
% Reduced/Free Lunch 24 100 68.47 22.31
% Fully Cred. 27 100 73.61 17.05
% Minority 22 100 74.78 25.40
Raymond did not indicate which of the 6 possible non-white racial groups she
included in the variables she calculated for the percentage of minority students.
This variable is not included in the original 2002 Base API data and thus must be
calculated from the variables indicating the percentages of students in each of 7
racial categories: African American, American Indian, Hispanic, Asian American,
Filipino, Pacific Islander, and White. In the analysis described here, I defined
“Percentage Minority” as the percentage of African American, Hispanic, and
American Indian students at a school and the results roughly parallel her
analysis.
According to Raymond, she used these sample means to select her cases, by
choosing all of the cases above the sample mean for percentage of students on
reduced/free lunch and percent minority students, and below the sample mean
for percentage of fully credentialed teachers (Raymond, 2003, 12). In
Raymond’s analysis, this yielded a sample of 584 schools, 565 of which had
information for all variables in the analysis. Using the means listed in Table 1
above to recreate Raymond’s sample, I initially selected 593 cases. Of these,
574 had complete information on all variables. In addition, I also corrected and
augmented the data using other datasets readily available from the CDE website
per the discussion above.
Finally, before turning to a discussion of specific variables, it should be noted
that there are 7444 schools in the 2002 API Base data with API scores. Of
these, 7225 have complete information on all of the variables in Raymond’s
analysis. Using either of these figures, Raymond’s sample of 565 schools is less
than 10% of the schools assigned 2002 Base API scores in the state.
Table 2 provides descriptive information on all variables in the analysis for three
groups: 1) a statewide sample of schools with 2002 API scores and information
on all variables in the analysis (Column 1); the 35 “Williams” schools with 2002
API scores and information on all variables I used to recreate the Raymond
analysis (Column 2); and the “comparison” schools chosen by following
Raymond’s inclusion criteria (Column 3).
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for All Variables
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 State 
Sample
N=7225
Mean 
(S.D.)
Raymond’s
Williams
Sample
N=35 (Note 5)
Mean (S.D.)
Comparison
Sample Using
Raymond’s
Criteria
N=547
Mean (S.D.)
Full 
Comparison 
Sample
N=582
Mean (S.D.)
2002 “Base” API 688.69 
(105.37)
575.83 
(105.52)
568.27 (61.36) 568.72 (64.75)
Elementary 
School
.71 (.45) .43 (.50) .78 (.41)*** .76 (.43)
Middle School .16 (.37) .26 (.44) .18 (.38) .19 (.39)
High School .13 (.33) .31 (.47) .03 (.18)*** .05 (.22)
% Minority 48.73
(29.76)
74.23 ( 25.56) 92.48 (6.62)*** 91.38 (9.91)
% Reduced/Free 
Lunch
48.58
(30.96)
68.14 (22.55) 90.20 (9.53)*** 88.88 (11.94)
% Fully Cred. 86.83
(13.28)
73.16 (15.53) 60.83 (11.64)*** 61.57 (12.25)
% Emergency 
Cred.
7.26
(9.52)
14.82 (12.63) 23.53 (13.21)*** 23.05 (13.38)
% Both Full and 
Emer.
1.32
(3.64)
1.69 (2.64) 1.27 (2.02) 1.29 (2.06)
% Credential 
Missing
4.59
(6.64)
10.33 (6.65) 14.32 (9.08)* 14.08 (9.00)
% English 
Learner
23.64
(21.85)
36.29 (21.79) 52.28 (19.94)*** 51.32 (20.40)
School Mobility 18.46
(14.10)
18.57 (9.29) 19.04 (14.85) 19.01 (14.57)
% Parents Not 
H.S. Graduates
20.16
(18.91)
32.69 (17.94) 43.17 (17.21)*** 42.54 (17.42)
% Response for 
Parent 
Education
76.62
(24.48)
71.51 ( 24.18) 63.59 (29.14) 64.07 (28.91)
***t-test comparing sample means for Columns 2 and 3 statistically significant at
p≤ .001
**t-test comparing sample means for Columns 2 and 3 statistically significant at
p≤ .01
*t-test comparing sample means for Columns 2 and 3 statistically significant at
p≤ .05
What should be immediately evident if you compare across columns are the
differences in means for the three groups of schools shown in the first three
columns. These three groups of schools are very different. Compared to the
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state as a whole, the 35 Williams schools included in the Raymond analysis are
disadvantaged across all variables. However, Raymond’s comparison group
(Column 3) is much more disadvantaged than the Williams schools in her
analysis. Comparison with the results presented in Table 1 suggest why this is
the case. Raymond used the group mean for the Williams schools on the three
selection variables. In addition, for a school to be included in the analysis it had
to fit all three of the selection criteria rather than any one of the three criteria.
This has the effect of selecting a more disadvantaged group overall for
comparison by definition because it excludes schools which are comparable to
the schools that are lower than the Williams schools’ group means on the
selection variables (in other words, the relatively advantaged among the Williams
schools). If we look at the standard deviations for the three groups, we can also
see that there is relatively less variation in the comparison group for most of the
explanatory variables than the other two groups. Because Raymond’s Williams
Schools group is so small (N=35), when it is combined with the comparison
group as shown in column 4, it has a minimal effect on the means for the full
comparison sample. To confirm this, I conducted t-tests on the sample means
shown in Columns 2 and 3. The asterisks in Column 3 indicate that most of the
differences in means between Raymond’s Williams schools and her comparison
group are statistically significant, which suggests that the schools are not
appropriate comparison groups as Raymond contends.
Another striking difference between the Williams schools and the other two
groups is that while the comparison group resembles the statewide sample in the
distribution of school types (elementary, middle, high), almost half of Raymond’s
Williams schools are middle and high schools. Finally, what should also be
noticeable from Table 2 is that in Raymond’s group of Williams schools and the
comparison group, there is a good deal of missing information in the two series
of variables for teachers’ credentials and parental education variables. When the
teacher credential variables are corrected using the Professional Assignment
Information Form as detailed above, higher poverty schools are more likely to
have missing information compared to the state as a whole. We see this in both
the Williams and the Raymond comparison groups, which on average are
missing information on about 10 percent and 14 percent of their teachers’
credentialing data, respectively. Similarly, in the average school in the state
sample just under 25% of the parent education information is missing. However
for the two comparison groups this figure increases to 28.5% for the Williams
schools and 36% for Raymond’s comparison group.
Regression Analyses
In Table 3, I present the results of initial regression analyses. In the first column I
provide the reanalysis using Raymond’s model in Table 2. In the columns that
follow I provide models for the statewide sample (Column 2) and the comparison
sample (Column 3). In both models I add the variables described above that
correct for missing information in the credential and parent education variables.
One of the problems with the statewide model shown in Column 2 is collinearity.
Collinearity occurs when the two or more of the independent or predictor
variables are highly correlated with one another. I address the issue of
collinearity in more detail in the following section where I discuss the issue of the
impact of credentials and other teacher characteristics on the model. However, I
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include this model here to illustrate the dramatic increase in the R-square for the
statistical model once the sample size is increased. In this case, the R-square of
.78 in the corrected model using the statewide sample (middle column) indicates
that these variables explain about 78% of the variation in school API scores.
Table 3
Regression Models Following Raymond’s analysis with
Statewide Sample and Reconstructed Sample
Raymond’s
Model in Table
2
Corrected Model 
Using Statewide
Sample
Corrected Model 
Using Comparison
Sample
Constant 694.98 
(33.86)***
853.41 (7.35)*** 790.06 (31.63)***
Middle School -45.11 (1.66)*** -63.58 ( 5.98)***
High School -107.58 (1.92)*** -92.87 (11.11)***
% Minority -1.65 ( .31)*** -1.01 ( .04)*** -1.51 ( .27)***
% Reduced/Free 
Lunch
.64 ( .27)* -1.53 ( .04)*** .04 ( .25)
% Fully Cred. .35 ( .21) .12 ( .07) -.09 ( .19)
% Both Full and 
Emer.
.26 ( .17) -.18 ( 1.06)
% Credential 
Missing
-.37 ( .12)** -1.28 ( .25)***
% English 
Learners
.31 ( .16) .17 ( .05)*** -.22 ( .15)
School Mobility -.35 ( .17)* -1.01 ( .04)*** -.48 ( .15)**
% Parents Not 
H.S. Graduates
-1.47 ( .17)*** -1.02 ( .06)*** -1.11 ( .16)***
% Response -- 
Parent Education
.08 ( .03)** .34 ( .08)***
Williams School -23.26 (11.94)* -18.07 (8.41)* -10.33 (10.62)
R-squared .18*** .78*** .39***
What we see from the comparison of the three models above is that the low
R-square reported by Raymond and the even lower R-square yielded in my
replicate analysis is due to two factors: 1) the criteria for selecting the sample as
discussed above which reduces the variation within Raymond’s sample on most
of the explanatory variables; and 2) the omission of important control variables
for school type and missing information in the credential and parent information
variables, which are among the most statistically significant variables in the
analysis. It is also worth noting that the coefficient for the Williams schools, while
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still negative, has decreased considerably with the corrected model (Column 3)
and is no longer statistically significant.
Is Teacher Certification and Other Types of Teacher Training
Important?
On the basis of these findings, Raymond argues that teacher certification has a
negligible effect on school performance. In addition, she also cites an earlier
study she conducted in the Houston Unified School District in which she argued
that on average Teach for America teachers did as well or better than their peers
(10). However, a more recent quasi-experimental study of Teach for America
teachers in 5 districts in Arizona (Laczko-Kerr and Berliner, 2002) which matched
Teach for America and other under-certified teachers with fully certified peers
found 1) little differences in student performance between Teach for America
teachers and other under-certified teachers (i.e. emergency credentialed
teachers); and 2) students taught by fully credentialed teachers outperformed
students taught by under-certified teachers. More specifically, their results
indicated that students taught by fully-certified teachers gained approximately
two additional months per academic year across subjects than students taught
by under-certified teachers.
Similarly, in an analysis of 1999 and 2001 API scores for elementary schools in
Los Angeles and San Diego, I found that the impact of teacher credentials
versus teacher experience varies based on district context (Powers, 2003). For
example, in Los Angeles, if we look at variables related to teachers’ credentials
and training, the main disparity between high poverty schools and low poverty
schools is the percentage of emergency credentialed teachers. In contrast, in
San Diego, where there is a relatively even distribution of emergency
credentialed teachers across the district, the main disparity between high poverty
and low poverty schools is the average years of teaching experience among the
teaching staff. Not surprisingly, these differences are reflected in the results of
regression models run separately for each district predicting the influence of
student and teacher characteristics on school achievement as measured by the
API. However, a more overarching conclusion that we can draw from this type of
analysis is that these types of disparities across schools do matter, and that
while public policies meant to address inequities might have to be tailored to the
specific features of the district context, they are not inconsequential.
In the section below, I provide a reanalysis of the API data, adding the variable
for teacher experience described above to the analysis. However, instead of
using Raymond’s list to select schools, I use a list of current Williams schools
provided by the plaintiff’s lawyers. I also utilize an alternative method of analysis.
Rather than examine API at one point in time, as in the Raymond analysis, I
examined the relationship between the API and the factors of interest – school
demographic variables and teacher qualifications – for the group of Williams
schools and the statewide sample with complete information on all variables
from 1999-2002. (Note 6) This yielded 29 of the 34 Williams schools, and 6452
cases for the statewide sample. According to my calculations, this group of 6452
schools is approximately 83% of all the schools eligible for a 1999 API. (Note 7)
The advantage of this strategy is that by using the same sample of schools over
all four years of the analysis, we can examine changes in the explanatory
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variables over time. In addition, using a statewide sample also addresses
Hoxby’s (2003) concern that arguments for increased equity rely on data that is
“representative of California public schools in general” (2). (Note 8)
As noted above, this analysis also utilizes the API scores that are the most
comparable across the four years – 1999-2001 API scores calculated using SAT
9 results only and the 2002 Growth API, which incorporates the results from the
California Standards Test (CST) in Language Arts only but otherwise is
calculated from SAT 9 test scores. Each of these files was matched to the files
created from the Professional Assignment Information Files described above for
the appropriate year, and then all four years of API data were merged together.
Finally, the cases with all information for all of the variables of interest were
selected for analysis. In the case of the Williams schools and the statewide
sample the 2002 sample means for the 4-year analysis were roughly similar to
the sample means using the 2002 data, (Note 9) which suggests that the
selection criteria requiring 4 years of data did not result in a consequential loss of
information for either group.
For ease of presentation, Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the Williams
schools and the statewide sample for 1999 and 2002. Like the Raymond sample
above, middle schools and high schools are over-represented in the Williams
sample compared to the state sample. 28% of the Williams schools are middle
and 41% are high schools compared to 16% and 12% respectively. It is also
worth noting that if we compare the means for the 35 schools used in Raymond’s
analysis shown in Table 2 to the means for this group, we see that the current
Williams schools are relatively more disadvantaged. (Note 10)
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for Statewide Sample of Schools with 
API Data from 1999-2002 and Current Williams Schools
Williams Schools
N=29
Statewide Sample
N=6452
1999
Mean (S.D.)
2002
Mean (S.D.)
1999
Mean (S.D.)
2002
Mean (S.D.)
API
464.52 
(65.51)
520.59 
(87.68)
632.37 
(131.76)
693.79 
(112.35)
Elementary .31 (.47) .34 (.48) .71 (.45) .71 (.45)
Middle .28 (.45) .24 (.44) .17 (.37) .17 (.37)
High .41 (.50) .41 (.50) .12 (.33) .12 (.33)
% Minority
84.74
(20.03)
85.59
(18.26)
47.43 (29.24) 49.82 (29.48)
% Reduced/Free 
Lunch
75.05
(18.30)
75.62
(16.44)
49.03 (29.96) 48.91 (30.73)
% English Learners
46.59
(20.76)
44.83
(20.59)
24.00 (21.91) 24.44 (21.46)
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Mobility
13.30
(18.50)
13.28 (6.72) 13.16 (12.74) 16.56 (9.49)
% Fully Cred.
71.25
(14.95)
69.75
(14.89)
86.71 (12.25) 87.17 (12.01)
% Emer. Cred
19.52
(14.37)
16.62
(13.92)
8.58 (9.90) 7.04 (8.38)
% Both Full and 
Emer.
2.90 (3.34) 2.24 (2.53) 1.92 (3.23) 1.27 (3.27)
% Missing 6.34 (3.24) 11.39 (6.97) 2.79 (4.56) 4.52 (5.90)
Yrs. Teach 12.31 (3.22) 11.63 (2.87) 13.24 (3.23) 13.25 (3.23)
% Yrs Tch. Missing 1.53 (2.01) 1.29 (1.45) .59 (1.90) .48 (1.83)
What should be immediately obvious from comparing across the columns is that
on average, the Williams schools have very different profiles than the state
average. Minority students and students receiving reduced and free lunch
comprise the majority of the student populations in Williams schools. It is difficult
to ascertain the changes in teachers’ credentials over time because in both the
Williams schools and the statewide sample, the percentage of teachers with
missing information has increased by approximately 40 percent for the two
groups from 1999 to 2002. (Note 11) Even in the unlikely scenario that all of the
teachers with missing information were fully credentialed and that the
percentage of teachers with emergency credentials has decreased by 2.9% in
the Williams schools over the four-year period – twice the rate of the statewide
sample – a large gap between the two groups remains. To put this figure in
perspective, we might do well to remember that if the percentage of emergency
credentialed teachers in the Williams schools was actually decreasing at that
rate, it still will take more than 12 years for the Williams schools to reach the
average for the state sample in 2002. In addition, while in the Williams schools
sample the average years of teaching experience among the teaching staff has
decreased slightly, in the statewide sample there is a very slight increase.
As I noted in the discussion of the replication of Raymond’s analysis above, if we
use the state sample of schools and the same group of independent variables in
the model, the problem of collinearity among the independent variables results.
Three variables among the group utilized by Raymond in her analysis are
particularly highly correlated: % Minority, % Reduced/Free Lunch, and % English 
Learners. It is not surprising that % Minority and % English Learners are highly
related since Latinos are the largest racial group in California’s public schools
and Spanish-speakers comprise the majority of the English learners in California.
(Note 12) Similarly, given the strong relationships between race and poverty in
the United States and the degree to which public schools continue to be
segregated by both race and class, it is not surprising to see a strong
relationship between these two variables. Tables 5 and 6 illustrate these
relationships in two different ways. First, I divided the 6452 schools in Table 4
above into quartiles by the variable % Minority using the 1999 data. In Table 5 I
present descriptive statistics for the first and fourth quartiles, the schools with the
least and the most minority students, respectively, for 1999 and 2002. Of the 29
Williams schools in the analysis, 23 or 79% fall into the fourth quartile.
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics for Schools with Least and Most Minority
Students 1999 and 2002
Schools with the Least
Minority Students in 1999
N=1616
Schools with the Most 
Minority Students in 1999
N=1611
1999
Mean (S.D.)
2002
Mean (S.D.)
1999
Mean (S.D.)
2002
Mean (S.D.)
API 775.52 
(81.53)
810.47 
(73.17)
485.02 
(68.56)
579.91 
(69.55)
% Minority 12.13 ( 5.26) 13.57 ( 6.37) 87.68 ( 8.53) 89.00 ( 7.52)
% Reduced/Free 
Lunch 17.97 (17.41) 16.91 (16.92) 81.41 (15.41) 83.00 (15.59)
% EL 5.75 ( 7.74) 6.13 ( 7.91) 48.21 (21.18) 47.60 (20.39)
School Mobility 10.42 (12.18) 13.53 ( 8.57) 14.39 (12.89) 17.57 ( 9.66)
% Fully Cred. 94.71 ( 5.78) 94.32 ( 6.48) 75.38 (13.57) 76.79 (13.92)
% Emer. Cred. 2.83 ( 4.45) 3.03 ( 4.62) 17.63 (11.85) 13.02 (11.07)
% Both Full and 
Emer. 1.10 ( 2.05) .87 ( 2.33) 2.34 ( 3.33) 1.62 ( 3.68)
% Credential 
Missing 1.35 ( 2.65) 1.77 ( 2.97) 4.65 ( 5.87) 8.57 ( 7.48)
Avg. Yrs. 
Teaching 14.17 ( 3.15) 14.50 ( 3.17) 12.00 ( 2.99) 11.70 ( 2.83)
% Yrs. Tch. 
Missing .26 ( 1.25) .44 ( 1.93) .92 ( 2.09) .60 ( 1.69)
Table 5 allows us to see the strong relationship between many of the
independent variables in the analysis. In general, schools that have relatively low
percentages of minority students also have relatively low percentages of
students eligible for reduced or free lunch, and relatively low percentages of
English language learners compared to schools with high percentages of
minority students. Mobility is also much lower in schools with less minority
students. Likewise, on average, the schools with the least minority students also
have much higher percentages of fully credentialed teachers (and conversely
fewer emergency credentialed teachers or teachers with both full and emergency
credentials indicating teaching out of field) and more experienced teachers.
Tables 6 shows the bivariate correlations between these variables of interest
over the four years of data, which allows to see trends over time in these
variables. The most striking feature of Table 6 is that it illustrates the strong
relationship overall between these variables. The lowest correlation between
pairs of variables is just under .75. What we see in Table 6 is while the
relationship between race and poverty at the school level is not only strong, but
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also consistently increasing from 1999-2002. It is also worth noting that with the
exception of 1999, % Minority is also the most highly correlated with the
variables for teacher credentials and experience (see Appendix).
Table 6
Correlations between Student Background Variables over Time
Bivariate 
Correlations
% Minority &
% Reduced/Free 
Lunch
%Minority 
&
% ELL
% Reduced/Free Lunch 
&
% ELL
1999 .818 .754 .762
2000 .834 .750 .768
2001 .834 .746 .771
2002 .842 .745 .763
In Table 7 I present regression models for 1999 and 2002 using the full state
sample. Because the yearly models use the same sample of schools, this
strategy allows us to look at changes over time in the regression coefficients. In
these models, I omitted the variable for % Minority after inspecting the
regression diagnostics for the full model (Note 13). There were two main reasons
for this choice: 1) this variable was marginally more highly correlated with the
other independent variables in the model for three out of the four years in the
analysis (Lewis-Beck, 1980); and 2) the percentage of students eligible for
reduced or free lunch is the more theoretically interesting variable. (Note 14) I
also included the controls for school type and the missing information on the
teacher qualifications variables utilized in the regression models above (not
shown). Finally, the last variable is an indicator variable denoting whether or not
the school is one of the 29 Williams schools. Because the teacher credential
variables add to 100%, they function as a set of indicator variables; % Fully
Credentialed is the omitted comparison category.
Table 7
Regression Models
1999 2002
Constant 845.02 ( 
1.76)***
819.40 ( 
4.26)***
887.70 
(1.73)***
863.01 
(3.90)***
% Red./Free 
Lunch
-3.21 ( .04)*** -3.21 ( .04)*** -2.67 ( .04)*** -2.68 ( .04)***
% EL -.80 ( .06)*** -.79 ( .06)*** -.57 ( .05)*** -.53 ( .05)***
School Mobility -.18 ( .06)** -.14 ( .06)* -.93 ( .08)*** -.89 ( .08)***
% Emer. Cred. -1.41 ( .08)*** -1.24 ( .09)*** -.34 ( .09)*** -.17 ( .09)***
% Both Full & 
Emer.
-1.59 ( .24)*** -1.39 ( .24)*** .10 ( .21)*** .27 ( .21)
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Avg. Yrs. 
Teaching
1.77 ( .27)*** 1.66 ( .23)***
Williams School -16.36 (11.32) -16.26 
(11.29)
-38.24 
(9.98)***
-37.88 
(9.94)***
R-squared .790*** .792*** .776*** .778***
In the first column for each year I present the models using just the teacher
credential variables. In the second column I add the teacher experience variable
to the model. The decrease we see in the coefficient for teacher credentials from
the first model to the second is not surprising as the two variables are related.
Schools with high percentages of teachers on emergency credentials are also
more likely to have less experienced teaching staffs. However, both variables
have a meaningful independent effect on the model, and the regression
diagnostics indicate that while the teacher experience variable is not unrelated to
the other variables in the model, it is not so highly correlated that it might
adversely affect the model.
The coefficient indicating whether or not the school is a Williams school is
negative across all of the models, and in 2002 the coefficient is statistically
significant. However, this coefficient should be interpreted with care because the
29 Williams schools are approximately one-half of one percent of the entire
sample of 6452 schools. While the coefficient is negative, which can be
interpreted that when all other factors in the model are statistically held constant,
Williams schools do worse than other schools, two factors might be considered
that temper this conclusion. First, this model controls only for the demographic
characteristics of the student body and teachers’ qualifications and not other
unmeasured factors such as facilities and textbooks that might also influence
student achievement. Second, the gap between Williams schools and all other
school using the “raw” API in Table 5 is just over 173 points in 2002, which is
considerably higher than the 38 point gap indicated by the coefficient for the
Williams schools which we might read as the gap in school API once student
and teacher characteristics are accounted for.
This strategy provides a good way to examine trends over time in the coefficients
and the overall strength of the model. For example the decreases in almost all of
the coefficients from 1999 to 2002 suggests regression to the mean. (Note 15)
To confirm this interpretation, I examined the change in API from 1999 to 2002
by calculating the raw change score by subtracting the 1999 API from the 2002
API. Next I correlated the 1999 to 2002 percentage change score with % 
Reduced/Free Lunch and % English Learners for 2002. The bivariate
correlations were .523 and .482 respectively (p≤ .001), which indicates that
schools with higher percentages of poor students and English learners made
greater gains in API over the four-year period. (Note 16)
The above strategy of analysis, which controls for school type, does not allow us
to discern whether or not the variables of interest might work differently across
school types. This is particularly important to consider given the predominance of
elementary schools in the statewide sample (71%). In Table 9 I present the
same models run separately by school type for 2002; descriptive statistics by
school type are shown in Table 8. However, because there are relatively few
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Williams schools in each of the categories, (Note 17) and the purpose of this
analysis is understanding the effects of teacher characteristics on each type of
school, I omitted this variable from the analyses.
Table 8
Descriptive Statistics by School Type, 2002 API Growth Data
Elementary
N=4588
Middle
N=1084
High
N=780
API 706.67 (111.43) 674.60 (112.94) 644.66 (98.85)
% Reduced/Free Lunch 52.79 ( 31.36) 44.98 ( 27.56) 31.54 (23.69)
% EL 26.91 ( 22.78) 20.25 ( 17.35) 15.75 (14.28)
School Mobility 17.18 ( 8.18) 17.01 ( 12.54) 12.28 (10.57)
% Emer. Cred. 6.29 ( 8.25) 9.13 ( 9.10) 8.53 ( 7.33)
% Both Full and Emer. 1.09 ( 3.04) 1.70 ( 3.69) 1.75 ( 3.76)
Avg. Yrs. Teaching 12.99 ( 3.31) 13.38 ( 3.05) 14.55 ( 2.64)
What we see from Table 8 is that there are important differences across the
school types. Students receiving reduced/free lunch and English learners are the
most highly concentrated in elementary schools and least concentrated in high
schools, with middle schools falling in between. This is in part because
elementary schools tend to serve the smallest geographical areas, and are thus
more likely to be economically segregated. The lower mobility in high schools
could also be attributable to the larger geographical areas served by high
schools as this variable measures within-district mobility; students whose
families move frequently within the district would probably be less likely to have
to change high schools than elementary or middle schools. While elementary
schools have lower percentages of emergency credentialed teachers on average
than middle and high schools, they also tend to have less experienced teaching
staffs (although the average difference between middle and elementary schools
is less than a percentage point).
Table 9
Regression Models by School Type, 2002 API Growth Data
Elementary
Coefficient 
(S.E.)
Middle
Coefficient 
(S.E.)
High
Coefficient 
(S.E.)
Constant 857.64 (4.49)*** 827.76 (9.31)*** 746.29 (15.22)***
% Reduced/Free 
Lunch
-2.65 ( .04)*** -3.01 ( .09)*** -2.20 ( .12)***
% EL -.51 ( .06)*** -.60 ( .13)*** -1.66 ( .20)***
School Mobility -.98 ( .10)*** -.47 ( .12)*** -.99 ( .19)***
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% Emer. Cred. .18 ( .11) -.71 ( .19)*** -1.42 ( .30)***
% Both Full and 
Emer.
.93 ( .26)*** -.51 ( .41) -1.86 ( .55)***
Avg. Yrs. Teaching 1.71 ( .26)*** 1.55 ( .04)** 2.17 ( .87)*
R-squared .777*** .820*** .689***
In Table 9 the regression models for each school type yield interesting findings.
Of particular note are the results for the teacher credential and experience
variables, all of which have the strongest effect in the high school model. This
finding is masked in the model shown in Table 7 because of the predominance
of elementary schools in the state sample. However, it is not surprising if we
consider that teaching at the high school level requires the most specialized
subject area training, which could also explain the strong negative effect of the
variable for the percentage of teachers with both full and emergency credentials
to the extent that it provides an indicator of the percentage of teachers teaching
outside their subject area training. This finding is also consistent with those of
Fetler (1999) who found that once student background characteristics are
controlled, teacher training and experience were the strongest predictors of high
school math achievement. (See also Darling-Hammond, 2000, more generally)
In sum, these findings make it much more difficult to dismiss the effect of
teachers’ credentials on school performance as measured by the API,
particularly at the high school level. To put these findings in more policy relevant
terms, on average, a five percent decrease in the percentage of emergency
credentialed teachers will increase school API by just over 7 points, which is
close to the average target increase in API of 7.86 for this sample of high
schools in 2002. (Note 18) The results obtained here also suggest that given the
current budget constraints facing the state of California, a policy aimed at
equalizing the quality of teachers across schools might be most effectively
targeted at high schools, much like California’s class-size reduction initiative
targeted the lower grades.
To bolster this interpretation, I present a final analysis in this section in which I
compare the 29 Williams schools with a group of comparison schools I created
by matching each of the Williams schools with a similar school by selecting out
all of the schools of the same type (elementary, middle, high) with the same
value on the variable % Reduced/Free Lunch in the 2002 API Growth data. From
the 29 lists that resulted, I chose a matching school for each Williams school by
choosing the school with the most fully credentialed teachers that was also the
closest match on the variable % English Learners. On average, this group had
close to 19 percent more fully credentialed teachers than the Williams schools
group. Thus, this comparison group most closely matches Raymond’s call for
comparing the achievement – or in this case what is more accurately described
as school performance -- of the Williams schools with schools that are
“abundant” in fully credentialed teachers, controlling for other factors. Table 10
provides descriptive statistics on the Williams schools and the “Abundant”
comparison group on the variables of interest for 1999 and 2002. In addition, I
also used t-tests to assess whether or not the differences in means across the
two groups are statistically significant. What we see from Table 10 is that the
three groups are roughly comparable in terms of student demographics. With the
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exception of % Minority between the Williams schools and the “Abundant”
schools, none of the differences in means for the background variables are
statistically significant. However, we also see that the major differences between
the two groups of schools are in the variables measuring teachers’ qualifications.
Table 10: Sample Means for Williams Schools and Comparison
Schools
Williams Schools
N=29
Mean
“Abundant” Schools
N=29
Mean
1999 2002 1999 2002
% Min. 84.74 85.59 70.89a 73.14a
% Reduced/Free Lunch 75.05 75.62 75.77 75.45
% English Learners 46.59 44.83 40.79 42.07
Mobility 13.30 13.28 8.81 12.59
% Emer. 19.52 16.62 7.35aaa 5.74aaa
% Fully Cred. 71.25 69.75 87.21aaa 88.42aaa
Yrs. Teach 12.31 11.63 14.17a 14.13aa
a
 Comparison with Williams schools mean statistically significant at p≤.05
aa
 Comparison with Williams schools mean statistically significant at p≤.01
aaa
 Comparison with Williams schools mean statistically significant at p≤.001
Figure 1 shows the mean API for the two groups of schools from 1999 to 2002.
What we see is that there is a consistent gap between the two groups of
schools, a good portion of which we can reasonably attribute to the differences in
teachers credentials across the two groups of schools as most of the
background characteristics of students have essentially been held constant.
(Note 19)
Figure 1. Mean API for Williams Schools and “Abundant” Schools:
20 of 31
1999-2002
Beyond Teacher Certification: Indirect Evidence of the
Importance of Facilities
While most of Raymond’s discussion focuses on teacher qualifications, her
findings can also be read as providing indirect evidence of the importance of
decent facilities on school performance. In one of her regression models with a
smaller sub-sample of her comparison group, she includes a variable for whether
or not the school is a year round school (Raymond, 2003a: Table 4). The
regression coefficient is large (-25.81) and statistically significant at p≤.05, which
indicates that within this sample of schools (Note 20) with all other factors held
constant, schools on a traditional calendar have an API score that is about 26
points higher than those on a year round calendar.
As noted above, there is no data available that would allow us to assess the
effect of facilities on school performance as measured by the API. However, as I
also noted, the year round multi-track calendars are utilized in California’s public
schools as a way to address overcrowding. According to the California
Department of Education, if 20 percent of the students attending year round
multi-track schools are “housed in excess of capacity at their school sites,” the
state and local school districts save approximately two billion in construction
costs (California Department of Education, 2003: 92). Of the four types of
multi-track calendars, “Concept 6” calendars are notable because they have
fewer instructional days. Thus, we might consider the use of year round
calendars, and in particular the “Concept 6” calendar a proxy for inadequate
facilities. In this section, I provide a more robust analysis of Raymond’s findings
which takes into account the different types of year round calendars by utilizing
additional demographic data available from the California Department of
Education that can be downloaded and matched to the API datasets.
The “Concept 6” calendar is used in only four districts across the state: Lodi
Unified, Los Angeles Unified, Palmdale Elementary, Vista Unified. (Note 21)
Lodi, Palmdale, and Vista are all small school districts with less than 30,000
students and well under 50 schools each. In Palmdale, all but one school in the
district follows the “Concept 6” calendar. In Lodi Unified and Vista approximately
half of the schools are “Concept 6” schools; however most other schools in Lodi
follow a traditional calendar while in Vista, the majority of the remaining schools
follow the other types of year round calendars. Because these three districts are
so small and have such divergent patterns in their utilization of four types of
calendars, I restrict the analysis to the Los Angeles Unified School District. The
second largest school district in the country, the Los Angeles Unified School
District also has a distribution of schools across the four types of school
calendars that best allow us to test the effect of school calendar on school
performance, controlling for other factors. This strategy also has the advantage
of controlling for possible district effects that might distort the results if the four
“Concept 6” districts were pooled for the regression analysis. Descriptive
statistics for the 571 schools in the Los Angeles Unified School District with 2002
Base API (Note 22) scores and complete information on all variables are
provided in Table 11.
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Table 11
Descriptive Statistics for the Los Angeles Unified School District
2002 API Base Data
Los Angles Unified School District
N=571
API 635.81 (97.73)
Elementary
Middle .14 ( .34)
High .09 ( .28)
% Reduced/Free Lunch 78.33 (25.52)
% English Learners 42.86 (23.30)
Mobility 15.54 ( 8.87)
% Fully Cred.
% Emer. 14.63 ( 8.47)
% Both Full and Emer. 2.47 ( 2.35)
Yrs. Teach 11.52 ( 2.41)
Traditional
YR Single .02 ( .15)
YR Mult. .06 ( .24)
“Concept 6” .31 ( .46)
Table 12 shows the regression model for the Los Angeles Unified School
District. The same variables used in prior analysis were included, including the
control variables for school type and missing information in the teacher variables
(not shown). Traditional is the omitted comparison category. As a result, a
positive coefficient on one of the remaining types of calendar variables indicates
that schools operating on that type of calendar have higher API scores than
schools running on traditional calendars. Conversely, a negative coefficient
indicates that a school operating on the designated calendar has a lower API
score than schools operating on a traditional calendar.
Table 12
Regression Model Testing for School Calendar
Los Angles Unified School District
API Base 2002
Coefficient (S.E.)
Constant 911.99 (19.67)***
% Reduced/Free Lunch -1.91 ( .13)***
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% English Learners -.72 ( .15)***
Mobility -1.17 ( .25)***
% Emer. -1.97 ( .34)***
% Both -1.18 ( .89)
Yrs. Teach .71 ( 1.18)
YR Single 58.54 (16.66)***
YR Mult. -8.56 ( 9.01)
“Concept 6” -13.94 ( 5.51)*
R-squared .767***
What we see from the results here is that in the Los Angeles Unified School
district, the district with 77 percent of all “Concept 6” schools in the state, with all
other factors held constant, “Concept 6” school have lower API scores than
schools on a traditional calendar. Conversely, schools on a year round
single-track calendar have higher API scores than schools on the traditional
calendar. Although there are only a small number of year-round single track
schools in the Los Angeles Unified School District, this finding is notable
because unlike the other types of year-round calendars, the year-round single
track calendar is not used to increase enrollment but is primarily intended to
increase student achievement by minimizing the learning gap over the summer
months. The year round single track calendar also increases the possibility for
remedial and enrichment classes during intersessions. While this model tests
how students are organized into facilities rather than directly testing the quality of
the facilities, we see from this analysis that, as with the quality of the teaching
staff, facilities are not inconsequential to school performance.
Conclusion
To a certain degree, Raymond and other expert witnesses for the state do agree
with at least some of the broad issues involved in the case, more specifically, the
importance of highly qualified teachers for student achievement. (Note 23)
However, they argue against the creation of policies to help ensure a more
equitable distribution of resources across schools. One of their main arguments
is that it is very difficult to define “quality” teachers and that the minimum
definition proposed by the plaintiffs – a fully credentialed teacher – doesn’t
measurably affect student achievement.(Note 24) Moreover, Raymond and other
state experts further argue that the cost of decreased local control outweigh any
possible educational effects of state policies mandating that schools and districts
hire fully credentialed teachers and provide current textbooks and adequate
facilities for their students. Finally, Raymond also asserts that these proposals
are not only fiscally unreasonable given California’s current budget crisis but
would also have the effect of “disenfranchising parents” because they would
“remove the option for parents to be co-creators of the educational programs
that best meet the needs of their children” (17).
It is difficult to imagine how ensuring that most, if not all teachers are
credentialed would disempower parents. While information regarding teachers’
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credentials is currently made available to parents in a standard reporting format
through state-mandated school accountability report cards, not only is there a
significant lag in the information (i.e. information about the prior school year is
reported in the report card published the following school year) but all of the
information is aggregated at the school level. As a result, it is difficult for a parent
to use this information to advocate for her/his child; the best remaining options,
then, are direct inquiry at the school or the word-of-mouth networks that exist
among parents. (Note 25) Given these conditions, it could be argued that
ensuring that most, if not all classroom teachers are fully credentialed would
actually empower parents because they can be assured that all of their children’s
teachers meet the criteria established for teachers by the California Commission
on Teacher Credentialing and can thus use their time and resources advocating
for their children in other arenas.
The results of these analyses suggest that short of desegregating schools by
socioeconomic status, increasing and equalizing the percentage of fully
credentialed teachers is an “input” that is not only relatively amenable to change
through state and local policy–and certainly much easier than building additional
facilities to ease overcrowding–but also contributes to school performance. (Note 
26) Addressing the disparities documented here might entail creating pay and
other incentives (e.g. increased autonomy) that would encourage experienced
teachers to work in high-poverty schools. (Note 27) And, given that the API is
essentially an average of student scores, while the magnitude of the effect on
schools is subject to debate, such a policy could make a large difference for the
academic achievement and life chances of individual students. Even if we accept
the argument that a more equitable distribution of teachers has a relatively small
but positive effect on achievement, we might also consider whether or not the
goal of increasing equity in public education – which this analysis suggests can
be done without sacrificing school performance – is an important and desirable
end in itself. As we consider the issues in this case, it is important not to let
statistical arguments about the determinants of school achievement and the
valorization of local control distract us from the larger issues of justice and
educational opportunity for all students that are at the heart of this case. For
those of us who are comfortably middle class or higher, why should we expect
poor and minority students to settle for anything less than the schools we want
and often demand for our own children?
Notes
1. For a synthesis of the plaintiffs’ experts’ reports see Oakes (2002a).
2. A May 2003 San Francisco Chronicle newspaper story reported that the state
has spent approximately $18 million fighting the case (Asimov, 2003).
3. Similar arguments were made by Hanushek (2003), Hoxby (2003), and Philips
(2003). I focus specifically on Raymond’s report here because of her use of API
data to create what she describes as “econometric models of educationally
challenged schools in California.” In contrast, Philips (2003) discussion of the
API is a secondary analysis of reports using API data.
4. Raymond indicates that she substituted API scores for prior years in the case
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of two schools without 2002 API. When I selected out the cases listed in
Raymond’s Table 1, I found a third school was missing API information. It is also
worth noting that two of the remaining 36 schools were not listed as plaintiff
schools on the Williams v. California website; however I included these in the
analysis for the purpose of reconstructing Raymond’s analysis as precisely as
possible. The Williams case website (www.decentschools.org) lists a total of 72
plaintiff schools, but it is unclear from Raymond’s narrative why her analysis
focused on the group of schools in listed in Table 1 of her report.
5. An additional school was missing information on the parent education variable
and was omitted from the analysis.
6. I also restricted the sample to schools with less than 30% missing information
on the teacher credentials and experience variables.
7. The 1999 API excluded alternative schools and schools with fewer than 100
students. In the 2000-2002 files used here, there was a fourth school type
indicating if the schools was a small school, i.e. the school only had between 11
and 99 valid tests available to calculate its API. Since none of the Williams
schools fell into this category, I omitted the approximately 39 schools designated
as small schools for these three years.
8. Hoxby also argues that “Good Research” utilizes extensive controls for family
background, measures that are either unavailable, or as I will detail below, in the
case of the parental education variables in the API unreliable. However, it is also
worth noting that Hoxby’s analysis of the effects of centralization on state
performance on NAEP provided in her report does not appear to control for
students’ family background.
9. For the 4-year state sample, the 2002 Growth API was less than 8 points
lower than the state sample in Table 2 above. The sample means on all other
variables were within a percentage point of each other.
10. 30 of these schools have 2002 Base API scores with a mean for this group is
529.13, which is roughly comparable. As with the state sample, the means on
the other variables using the 2002 Base API sample are all within a percentage
point or two of those presented for 2002 in Table 4.
11. If we look at the percentage of fully credentialed teachers in the Williams
schools for 2000 and 2001, both years with less missing information than 2002,
there trend is somewhat inconsistent but tends more towards a decreasing
percentage of fully credentialed teachers. In 2000, the average Williams school
had 68.91 percent of the teachers were fully certified (7.96 percent missing
information). In 2001 the same figure was 70.16 (9.41 percent missing
information).
12. According to 2001-2002 figures available on EdData (http://www.ed-
data.k12.ca.us/welcome.asp), in 2001-2002, 44.2 percent of all California public
school students were Latino. Of the 25.5% English Learners in California’s public
schools, 21.2% were Spanish speakers.
13. Subtracting the tolerance statistic from 1 gives us the R-squared from the
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regression of all the other independent variables on the independent variable of
interest (R2j where j=the variable of interest). Fox (1991) recommends taking the
square root of R2j, noting that when this figure approaches .9, collinearity
becomes a serious problem for the estimation of regression coefficients. In this
case, I obtained Rj of .88 for the variable % Minority for three of four year of the
analysis (this figure was only marginally lower for the 1999 model).
14. See, for example the analysis by Phillips, Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, Klebanov,
and Crane in Jencks and Phillips (1998). .
15. I could have just as easily chosen the 1999 figures for % Reduced/Free
Lunch and % English Learners as they correlate at r> .95 for both variables,
reflecting the relative stability of these variables over time.
16. Rogosa (2001, 2002) notes that this pattern is in part a result of how the API
is constructed. Because the API is constructed by using a percentile rank metric,
students in the highest scoring schools can’t raise school scores because they
have “topped out” the index.
17. 10 of the Williams schools are elementary schools, 7 are middle schools and
12 are high schools.
18. A schools API target or the amount its API should increase from one year to
the next is determined by taking 5 percent of the difference between the school’s
API in a given year and 800 which is the target API for all schools set by the
state. Rogosa (2002) has argued that a difference in API of 5 points or fewer is
not significant and is approximately equivalent to about half of the students
answering an additional question on the SAT-9 test correctly. Rogosa (2000) has
also estimated that if every student increased their percentile rank on each test
by one point, the school’s API would increase by 8 points (1). I frame the results
in terms of the growth targets set by the state because irrespective of the
educational consequences of a rise and fall in API, whether or not schools reach
their targets has important political consequences for schools because it is one
of the criteria for determining whether or not a school is labeled as performing
adequately or inadequately by the state.
19. Even we look at the range of API between these two groups as Rogosa
(2001) suggests, although there is substantial overlap in the middle, the lowest
boundary for the Williams schools is substantially lower than the minimum for the
“Abundant” schools. Likewise, the maximum value among the “Abundant” school
is much higher than the maximum value for the Williams schools. I also chose a
second comparison group by matching each school by school type and % 
Reduced/Free Lunch and % Fully Credentialed. On average, the API scores of
this second comparison group were slightly higher than the Williams schools, but
the difference in means was not statistically significant.
20. The 129 schools in this model are most likely predominantly middle schools
and high schools because one of the variables in the model that Raymond
describes as Number of Core Classes missing information for most schools in
the full dataset. However, this variable appears to be mislabeled on the CDE
website. For all of the other API datasets with the exception of the 2002 Base
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API Raymond used in her analysis, this variable indicates the Average Size
Class, Core Classes, which include the following subject areas: English, Foreign
Languages, Math, Science, and Social Science (California Department of
Education, Policy and Evaluation Division, 2003: 8). Given this definition, it is not
surprising that so many schools were missing information on this variable; if one
examines the data by looking at the distribution of the variable by school type
(elementary, middle, high) 87.5% of the 2302 schools with information on this
variable were middle and high schools. As a result, it is also likely that many of
the Williams schools were not included in this model. Interestingly, Raymond
uses this model – with an incorrectly interpreted coefficient – as evidence for her
assertion that other types of improvements will increase student achievement
more than increasing the percentage of fully certified teachers.
21. In contrast, well over 100 districts have schools following various types of
year round multi-track calendars other than the Concept 6 calendar.
22. I use the 2002 API Base Data because here, unlike the prior analyses,
understanding changes over time is less important and the 2002 Base data with
its greater incorporation of the CST, is currently the most politically salient for
schools. However, the results I obtained here are consistent with the results
using the 2002 Growth API data, which is not surprising because the 2002
Growth API and the 2002 Base API correlate at .999.
23. Raymond (2003) writes: “There is no quibble that the three proposed
solutions – sufficient textbooks, quality teachers, and adequate facilities – play a
role in the production of good education. But the definitions of “sufficient,”
“quality,” and “adequate” are elusive and highly subjective. Moreover, it is a large
leap to accept that these elements are only effective in the precise formulations
advanced by the experts” (11). Similarly, Philips (2003) writes: “Though
inconvenient, students can share books, use copied materials, or internet
resources, wear coats in a cold classroom, or use a restroom on another floor.
But if a classroom teacher is not able to effectively focus instruction on the state
content standards, for the subject area of the class, disadvantaged children may
be ill-equipped to learn the material on their own” (75).
24. To some degree, this is a moot point since No Child Left Behind requires that
all teachers of core subject areas be “highly qualified” by the 2005-2006 school
year. Teachers on emergency permits, waivers, or pre-intern certificates do not
meet the criteria for “highly qualified.” A June 2003 memo from the State
Superintendent of Public instruction directs districts, counties and charters
schools to focus their current hiring and recruitment efforts on teachers that meet
the NCLB requirements (O’Connell, 2003).
25. A similar argument can be made about textbooks. Even if classroom
teachers use textbooks differently, wouldn’t it be more empowering to parents to
know that the current textbooks are available in their child’s classroom for the
teacher to use at her/his discretion?
26. Kahlenberg (2001) argues that the economic integration of schools could
also be a strategy to insure a more equal distribution of teachers across schools
(78-80).
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27. As noted above, some of the changes generated in the wake of NCLB
address the issue of credentialing. However, the results of an earlier analysis
focusing on the Los Angeles Unified School District and the San Diego Unified
School District suggested that the gains made from hiring more fully credentialed
teachers could be offset by a loss in more experienced teachers as this will in all
likelihood emerge as a source of inequality between schools once the disparities
in credentials are equalized (Powers, 2003).
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Appendix
Table A1
Correlations between Student Background Variables and 
Teacher Qualifications Variables Over Time
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Bivariate Correlations: %
Emer. Cred and…
% 
Minority
% Reduced/Free 
Lunch
% English 
Leaners
1999 .589 .457 .469
2000 .566 .447 .429
2001 .510 .378 .378
2002 .457 .347 .340
Bivariate Correlations: Avg.
Yrs Exper and …
% 
Minority
% Reduced/Free 
Lunch
% English 
Learners
1999 -.272 -.279 -.284
2000 -.325 -.306 -.308
2001 -.332 -.293 -.318
2002 -.343 -.302 -.315
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